Transactions of RHASS Volume 1940 - Page 013
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| Year | 1940 |
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14 THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON AGRICULTURE. after this war. It is difficult to estimate the value of these promises. A different Government may be in power, and, even if the same Government is in power, conditions may be such that reasonable excuses could be offered for not treating agriculture in accordance with the farmers’ interpreta- tion of war-time official pronouncements. Before the war there were strong influences working against an expansion of British agriculture. In normal times our exports and the interest on our foreign investments are paid for largely by imported food, and about two-fifths of our shipping is occupied in carrying food. The financial interests concerned with these have a pOWerful political influence. Hence, after the war, when increased home production is no longer needed, these influences are likely to be brought to bear in reducing agri- culture to its peace-time level of output. It may be unfor- tunate for many farmers, who have gone to the expense of breaking up large tracts of less productive land and providing themselves with the necessary equipment to keep it in cultiva- tion, to find that the produce from that land is no longer needed. Indeed, this might occur to some extent during the war. We are making large purchases of foodstuffs from neutral countries to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. If the Navy is as successful in keeping the seas open as it has been, there may be no shortage of some foods, in which case there is not the same need for paying the prices needed to increase home production. If the increased production is wanted only during the war, the Government must pay a price high enough to cover the cost involved in the dislocation of the industry due to the war and the dislocation due to post-war readjustment to the peace-time level of production. On the other hand, if the increased production is to be permanent a lower price would suffice. The Government must make up its mind what amounts of the different foods it wishes British agriculture to produce and whether or not it wishes these amounts of foods to con~ tinue to be produced after the war. But this would involve a long-term agricultural policy which would reconcile all national interests concerned with food. There is little hope of such a policy emanating from Whitehall, because, in normal times, there is no single minister responsible for food. The Minister of Agriculture deals only with home production, and, in trying to do anything for agriculture, has to fight other interests. The weakness of the position has been shown by the war. A special Ministry of Food had to be set up, and even it has not been able to deal with the situation. It has been necessary to appoint the Lord Privy Seal as Chairman of a group of Ministers dealing with food. The Ministers concerned are all already over-worked, and for most of them —'—as, for example, the Secretary of State for Scotland—food THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON AGRICULTURE. 15 forms only a relatively small part of their duties. When the war finishes, this emergency attempt to get some sort of co-ordinated food policy will come to an end. Harassed as the Ministers are with the immediate war problems, it is very doubtful whether they will give much consideration to a long-range agricultural policy, or even to the post-war effects of emergency food measures. If we are to have a permanent policy for agriculture, it will need to be evolved not by politicians but by the farmers themselves. In the past the objectives they have fought for, such as a guaranteed price for cats or a higher subsidy for cattle, were far too limited and they were considered neither in relation to each other nor in relation to agriculture as a whole. We have had ten years hand-to-mouth ‘trial and error ’ expedients, followed now by war emergency measures. If we are to escape the post-war slump we should be working now towards a permanent agricultural policy based on national food requirements. The Astor-Rowntree inquiry, which was the most exhaustive investigation and is the most authoritative statement on agriculture in relation to national needs, showed that a food policy based on nutritional needs involves increased home production without a decrease in our imports which would interfere with our exporting industries or overseas investments. If all the different agricultural organisations referred to in the opening paragraph could get together and prepare a policy which they could present to whatever Govern- mentgwould be in power at the end of the war, there would be a good chance of having the policy adopted. A national food policy based on human needs would have the support of the consumers and also of social reformers and ‘planners,’ who realise that a flourishing countryside and a well-fed population are the only basis for social and economic stability. REFERENCES. Series of Reports on Scottish Agriculture, published by National Development Council of Scotland. 1934. Food, Health, and Income. (Orr.) Macmillan & Co., London. 1936. The People’s Food. (Sir William Crawford.) Heinemann, London. 1938. First Report. Ministry of Health. Advisory Committee on Nutrition. H.M.S.O. 1937. Feeding the People in War-Time. (Orr.) Macmillan & Co., London. 1940. Food Production in War. (Sir Thomas Middleton.) The Clarendon Press. 1923. British Agriculture. The Principles of Future Policy. (Viscount Astor and Seebohm Rowntree.) Longmans, London. 1938. How to Pay for the War. (Keynes) Macmillan & Co., London. 1940. |
| Title | Transactions of RHASS Volume 1940 - Page 013 |
